n kidney allocation, transplant candidates may have private information about their propensity to enjoy good outcomes after transplantation or about their relative expected improvement in quality of life after transplantation. This paper develops a mechanism design model to investigate the effect of such information asymmetry on the kidney allocation system. In this model, there are n transplant queues corresponding to n candidate types. Candidate types are only observed by the candidates, and each candidate chooses the queue to join by reporting a type. Kidneys have heterogeneous types, and each kidney will be assigned to one of the queues depending on its type. Candidates report their type strategically to join the queue that maximizes their utility. Candidate utility depends on the type of kidney received and the expected waiting time, which is calculated using fluid approximations. We consider two alternative social welfare functions: aggregate utility (emphasizing efficiency) and minimum utility across all candidates (emphasizing equity). The kidney allocation problem is to divide the organ supply among the different queues so that social welfare is maximized, and this problem is solved explicitly under both objective functions. There are three findings: (1) The allocation mechanism induces truth telling by ensuring that candidates who wait longer receive better kidneys; (2) Information rents are earned by high-risk candidates under the efficiency objective and by low-risk candidates under the equity objective; (3) a choice-based kidney allocation system in which candidates choose the type of queue to join leads to outcomes in the middle of the efficiency-equity spectrum.
Introduction
The following decision-making problem arises in the context of the kidney transplant waiting system: A transplant candidate is offered a kidney for transplantation, and she is given one hour to decide whether to accept it. The candidate will reach a decision by seeking input from the transplant team, and she must weigh the benefits from accepting that kidney against the consequences of waiting longer if she declines the offer. Waiting longer involves the risk that her medical condition may deteriorate, rendering her unsuitable for transplantation. However, there is also the upside that the next organ offered to her would provide a better outcome. This decision will be influenced by objective medical information about the candidate's condition and the organ's features, provided by the transplant team, but it will also include a subjective component, for there is still no uniformly acceptable set of objective medical criteria that can adequately capture the complexity of this decision, and because individual preferences regarding transplantation vary. The subjective component of this process is critical in determining the final decision and represents information that is available to the candidate and her transplant team, but not to the system that offered the organ to that candidate.
Failing to recognize the role of individual decision making and private information in the kidney transplantation system has two important implications: (i) Finding a candidate to accept a kidney, especially one of low quality, could take precious time in the critical first few hours after the identification of a donor, and this can lead to inferior medical outcomes; in fact, more than half of the transplanted donor kidneys have been turned down by other candidates higher up on the waiting list (see UNOS 1997);
(ii) the kidneys offered to individual candidates may not reflect the most efficient matching between candidates and donors. This paper's first contribution is to propose a novel organ allocation system that attempts to overcome some of these problems by having candidates declare which types of kidneys they would be willing to accept at the time they join the waiting list, and not at the time they are offered a kidney. This eliminates a lengthy search at the time of transplantation, and it ensures that each candidate's private information is reflected in the allocation process. In more concrete terms, the proposed system assumes n types of candidates that arrive according to a Poisson process to join the waiting list. Each candidate's type is known to that candidate only. Kidneys arrive according to an independent homogeneous Poisson process, and each kidney is classified into one of n classes based on its clinical characteristics. Newly arrived candidates are given the choice to decide which of the n kidney classes they would prefer and join the corresponding queue for that class by determining which class maximizes their expected utility (which is a function of the expected transplant outcomes and expected waiting time). While waiting, candidates may leave the queue either because their health has deteriorated and they become unsuitable for transplantation, or they may die. The paper's second contribution is to recognize that the mechanism used to allocate kidneys into different classes is the main factor driving the choices of the transplant candidates and the performance of the transplant waiting system. This leads to the formulation of the following mechanism design problem: Design n different classes of kidneys, with each class intended to attract candidates of a single type, and with the objective of maximizing a global utility function that reflects an overarching objective for the organ allocation system. Because it is well accepted that any organ allocation system must achieve two objectives-to maximize clinical efficiency and to enhance equity in access to transplantation-our analysis also considers two such objectives. The efficiency objective is defined as the sum of the expected utilities of all candidates, whereas the equity objective is Rawls's (1999) max-min criterion, defined as the minimum incremental improvement in the expected utility of the different candidate types (the increment is over the baseline case where the candidates do not have access to transplantation).
The analysis of this problem leads to the following results. First, there is an inherent trade-off between waiting time and kidney quality (as measured by a kidney's projected outcomes) that is exploited by the optimal mechanism (under both efficiency and equity objectives). Low-risk candidates (i.e., candidates with low risk of posttransplantation adverse events) prefer to wait longer for organs of higher quality, while high-risk candidates trade off the quality of the organ for a shorter wait. Second, under both the equity and efficiency objective, the optimal mechanism generates an assortative allocation system: Low-risk candidates receive high-quality organs, but wait longer than the high-risk candidates who receive low-quality organs. Third, information asymmetry benefits high-risk candidates under the efficiency objective, but the benefit shifts to the low-risk candidates under the equity objective. This implies that information asymmetry reduces the gap in outcomes and access between the lowest-risk and the highest-risk cases. The usual disclaimer applies, that these results depend on a series of simplifying assumptions regarding the candidate's utility function, the exact interpretation of the candidate's and organ's type and their impact on medical outcomes, the exact medical outcomes used in the definition of the utility, and the nature of information asymmetry. These assumptions will be discussed in the main body of the analysis.
Our analysis presents a novel application area for mechanism design. In economic theory, "mechanism design" refers to the design of optimal rules in markets that involve some form of information asymmetry. The prototype example is provided by the following intrafirm resource allocation problem studied in Groves (1973) : Firm headquarters must allocate resources among several business units. Each business unit has a pet project; it retains the earnings generated by the project and has private information about its productivity. The firm's problem is to determine the rule it uses to allocate resources across the business units in order to maximize total firm value. In the optimal mechanism, business units that request more resources are willing to pay increasingly more for these resources because they can utilize them in more productive activities. In many ways the Groves mechanism is not unlike the mechanism studied here, but it involves an important difference: In the intrafirm resource allocation problem monetary transfers are essential in the allocation rule, but in the kidney allocation problem no such transfers are possible. Instead, it is as if each transplant candidate is endowed with a finite amount of time she can spend waiting, and based on her information decides how much of that time to spend waiting. Therefore, just as the most productive business units are willing to spend increasingly more for the firm's resources, the lowest-risk candidates are willing to spend more time waiting in order to receive organs of higher quality. Other applications of mechanism design include labor contracts as in Hart (1983) , and monopolistic pricing as in Maskin and Riley (1984) .
Our paper also expands the nascent literature on model-based analysis of the organ allocation system. There are two distinct streams: one that focuses on organ allocation decisions, and a second on organ acceptance decisions. On organ allocation, David and Yechiali (1990) explicitly formulate organ allocation as a dynamic stochastic assignment problem. Zenios et al. (2000) proposed a dynamic control model, while Votruba (2002) advocated a static assignment formulation. On organ acceptance, Israel and Yechiali (1985) modeled candidates' decisions as an optimal stopping problem; Ahn and Hornberger (1996) adopted a decision-theoretic perspective; and Howard (2002) used dynamic programming to analyze organ acceptance decisions. There are also several papers proposing heuristic policy improvements and evaluating these suggestions relative to current practice. For example, Bryan et al. (2003) empirically justified a proposal to revise the number of priority points awarded for tissue matching; Fritsche et al. (2003) suggested assigning kidneys from elderly donors to elderly candidates and found improved survival outcomes. Schnitzler et al. (2003) used Markov models to capture transplant candidate decision making. Unlike these papers, our work assumes that transplant candidates have private information. A similar assumption is made in Roth et al. (2004) , where the authors use two-sided matching theory to design a kidney exchange system similar to the one to be described in §2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information about kidney transplantation focusing on the issues that motivated this paper. Section 3 introduces the model and formulates the mechanism design problem. Section 4 introduces a method based on "achievable regions" to compute the optimal solution efficiently. Section 5 provides an analytical solution to the problem. Section 6 provides comparative statics focusing on the impact of the global objective function and of information asymmetry on candidate outcomes. Section 7 presents a numerical study based on historical transplant data. Concluding remarks appear in §8. The appendix contains all the proofs.
Background on Kidney Transplantation
Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment option for candidates with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). However, a continued shortage of donated organs contributes to an ever-increasing waiting list. Although there are variations on the priority system used depending on the state and region, in the typical U.S. arrangement transplant candidates receive priority points based on their accumulated time on the waiting list and on a range of medical criteria. When an organ becomes available for transplantation, it is offered to the candidate with the largest number of points. The rationale behind this system is intuitive: Organs should be allocated in a fashion that balances clinical efficiency (meaning that the organ should be assigned to the candidate expecting the greatest improvement) and equity (meaning that all candidates should have equal chances of receiving an organ). Medically based priority points reflect the former objective, whereas wait-based points capture the latter.
More recently, the system was refined in an effort to improve the utilization of untapped sources of organs. An expanded-criteria donor (ECD) program was implemented nationwide, in which kidneys from older donors with some comorbidities are classified as ECD and allocated to candidates who have declared their willingness to accept these organs. The mechanism considered in this paper represents the natural expansion of the ECD system. In another initiative, some transplant candidates are granted absolute priority if they have a blood-incompatible living related donor who is willing to donate an organ to the general waiting-list pool; this is the so-called "list-paired" exchange program. The limited experience from these initiatives confirms that transplant candidate decision making plays an important role. Private communications with physicians at the University of California, San Francisco, and Stanford University suggest that the implementation of the ECD program accelerates the placement of kidneys from such donors, but the demand for these donors is less than what one would expect based on purely clinical perspective. Data from an early implementation of the list-paired exchange program in New England indicate that the candidates benefiting from the program are opting to wait for organs from younger donors that tend to generate better outcomes; see Delmonico et al. (2004) .
In summary, the experience to date from kidney allocation in the United States demonstrates that the overarching objective of the system is to balance equity with efficiency. Furthermore, candidate decision making is taking an ever-increasing role, and it includes a significant subjective component.
Model Description and Problem Formulation
We present the model formulation in two steps. In the first step we assume that each candidate's type (or class) is publicly observable, and in the second step we expand the formulation to the case of hidden information.
Full Information
There are n types of candidates who join the waiting list according to independent Poisson processes with rates 1 n . The total candidate arrival rate is denoted by ≡ n i=1 i . Each candidate will depart from the system after an exponentially distributed length of time with mean d (interpret d as the candidate's life expectancy while waiting) unless they receive a transplant in the meantime. Kidneys arrive according to an independent Poisson process with rate ; < signifies organ shortage. Without loss of generality, time is scaled so that ≡ 1. Each kidney has a random type X, uniformly distributed in the unit interval 0 1 , and the types are independent and identically distributed across kidneys. When a type x kidney arrives, it is assigned to a type i candidate with probability p i x . This decomposes the waiting list into n queues. The arrival rate of candidates into queue i is i , and the kidney arrival rate into the same queue is i = E p i X .
The utility of a type i candidate is given by her quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE), which depends on five quantities: D i , the pretransplant life expectancy measured from the time the candidate arrives to the time she either receives a transplant or departs the system; i , the probability the candidate will receive a transplant; T i , the candidate's life expectancy after transplantation; , the quality-oflife score on the waiting list; and , the quality-of-life score with a transplant (it is currently estimated that = 0 75 and = 0 9, de Wit et al. 2002) . Then, the utility of that candidate is
Quality-adjusted life years may be discounted at rate r by replacing the departure rate 1/d described above by r + 1/d; in the remainder it will be assumed that r = 0 without loss of generality. The quantities (D i p i T i ) depend on the allocation policy in the following way. First, let L i x = m + c i g x denote the posttransplant life expectancy of candidate i receiving kidney x; the quantities m, c i , and g i x are interpreted at the end of this section. Then, the posttransplant life expectancy can be expressed as
Next, for the pretransplant life expectancy, D i , and the probability of survival until transplantation, i , we can use the following closed-form approximations derived in Zenios (1999) :
These approximations assume a fluid limit with a scaling factor n → , scaled arrival rates n i and n i , and with
They apply to any system involving large numbers of candidates and donors. Substituting (2)- (5) into (1), and after some straightforward algebra, one derives the following expression:
In the remainder, we will omit the constant term d from the utility expression and interpret U i as the increase in QALE relative to never receiving a transplant (which yields QALE of d ). We will also assume that a > 0. This implies that the worst possible outcome with transplantation is better than staying on the waiting list in perpetuity. In the language of mechanism design, this assumption reflects a participation constraint: Participating in this allocation mechanism is a dominant strategy for all transplant candidates.
Hidden Information
When the candidate's type is known only to the candidate herself, the model becomes more elaborate. First, each candidate declares their typeî (this declaration may or may not be truthful), and then joins the corresponding queueî. To study how candidates' choices are made, one must focus on the following Bayesian Nash equilibrium: All transplant candidates have individual prior beliefs over the choices that will be made by all other candidates; they make their utility-maximizing declarations (given these beliefs); and the eventual choices made by all candidates must be consistent with initial beliefs. Furthermore, the revelation principle states that one can focus on equilibria in which candidates declare their types truthfully. This implies imposing a truth-telling constraint as follows: Let U ij denote the (incremental) expected utility of a type i candidate who joins the type j queue under the beliefs that all other candidates report their types truthfully; as before, this incremental utility is over the candidate's expected utility without a transplant. Then,
This expression states that when a type i candidate joins a type j queue, her expected time on the waiting list and expectation of receiving a transplant is the same as everyone else's in the same queue (this is reflected in a j / j ), but the posttransplantation life expectancy depends both on her type i (through b i and on the allocation policy to queue j (through j / j ). Consequently, the truth-telling constraint becomes
That is, the best choice for each type i candidate is to join queue i (assuming all other candidates do the same).
Problem Formulation
We are now in a position to formulate the kidney allocation problem as a mathematical program. We consider two problems where the goal is to determine the allocation probability p = p i x in order to maximize: (a) The utilitarian efficiency objective
subject to (5) and (8) 
subject to (5) and (8). The formulation without the incentive compatibility constraint is known as the full-information (or first-best) case. It provides a useful benchmark when assessing the effect of information asymmetry on the performance of the kidney allocation system.
Discussion of Assumptions
Our formulation involves several assumptions that need to be addressed.
(i) Utility Function. The candidate's utility function highlights the trade-off between the quality and quantity of organs assigned to each queue. The utility of the candidates in each queue increases when the quantity ( i ) or the quality ( i ) increase. However, because the effect of quality on the total expected utility depends on the candidate's type, it follows that in an optimal allocation policy, low-risk candidates will be willing to wait longer to receive an organ of the same quality than high-risk candidates. This can enable the designer of the mechanism to separate candidates according to their types.
(ii) Global Objectives. The efficiency objective (9) states that an allocation policy must maximize the total expected utility of the population of transplant candidates. However, because this utilitarian perspective may shift transplant resources away from the most vulnerable candidate groups and toward those groups who respond more positively to transplantation, the equity objective (10) reflects the notion that the ultimate goal of any allocation policy is to maximize the utility of the most vulnerable candidate group. This reflects the "veil of ignorance" notion of fairness introduced in Rawls (1999) : When resources are allocated to different groups, the allocation decision should be made under the assumption that the decision maker does not know in which group she belongs. In that case, she will allocate the resources in a conservative way to maximize her utility in the worst-case scenario. Although an exact mathematical representation of the equity objective remains elusive, we believe the max-min definition proposed here is appropriate, for it is consistent with existing philosophical studies of fairness and it leads to a tractable formulation, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent sections.
(iii) Pretransplant Life Expectancy. The assumption that all candidates have the same pretransplant life expectancy is made primarily for the sake of tractability. In reality, the transplant environment presents two dimensional heterogeneity because candidates differ both in pretransplant and posttransplant life expectancy. However, multidimensional mechanism design problems are extremely cumbersome and their solutions are difficult to interpret (Rochet and Chone 1998) . We have chosen to focus on posttransplant heterogeneity, while holding pretransplant death rates constant across all candidates. This is because posttransplant heterogeneity explains a larger portion of the survival variation across transplant candidates according to results used in a previous study (Su et al. 2004a) . Furthermore, the ratio of the coefficients of variation (of posttransplant to pretransplant life expectancies) is 1.9, suggesting that posttransplant survival is almost twice as dispersed as pretransplant survival. To the extent that posttransplant heterogeneity dominates pretransplant heterogeneity, the insights from our simpler model are expected to be relevant and capture the first-order effects. This assumption is relaxed in the numerical study of §7, and the resulting computational results do not differ significantly from the theoretical solutions derived under the assumption of constant pretransplant life expectancy.
This assumption also implies that the candidate's health condition does not change while on the transplant waiting list. ESRD is a slowly deteriorating condition, so a candidate's health condition may deteriorate over time and this could change their preferred type of organs. Capturing this level of realism in the model appears to be a challenging task, and while clinically relevant, it is left as a topic for future research.
(iv) Posttransplant Life Expectancy. Our model assumes the following function for posttransplant life expectancy: L i x = m + c i g x . This can be interpreted as a baseline (minimum) posttransplant life expectancy m, plus a variable component c i g x that depends on the quality of the kidney and the type of the candidate. The variable component implies that low-risk candidates (i.e., candidates with high c i ) attain an incrementally higher life-expectancy improvement than high-risk candidates. This is justifiable because low-risk candidates, who are less likely to die from either renal and nonrenal diseases, are more likely to enjoy the benefits of a high-quality kidney for its entire life span. It is also assumed that m ≥ 0, g x ≥ 0, g x < 0, and c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c n , implying that high-quality donors have low x and candidates are ranked in order of increasing risk.
The function L i x reduces all kidney and candidate attributes to a single kidney and candidate "type." This one-dimensional representation can be derived from clinical data as follows: Let the instantaneous hazard rate for organ failure be represented by the proportional hazards model exp v y + w z , where y is a vector of kidney clinical variables, z is a vector of candidate clinical variables, and , v, w are empirically estimated coefficients; see Cox and Oakes (1984) for a general presentation of survival analysis and Su et al. (2004b) for an application of such a model to transplant data. The quality of the kidney is captured by the one-dimensional quantity v y, and a change of variables leads to a uniform probability distribution. Similarly, the survival risk of a candidate is summarized by the one-dimensional quantity w z. When applied to the function L i x , the proportional hazards model implies m = 0, x = v y, g x = exp −x , and c i = exp −w z i , where z i is a vector of covariates reflecting type i candidates. More realistic functions could also be considered, and relevant results for such functions are presented in Su (2004) .
Other representations of posttransplant survival are certainly possible. First, tissue-matching effects between donor and candidate could be captured; however, such interaction effects, while present, have been diminishing in significance over time (see Su et al. 2004b ). Second, time-varying mortality rates (i.e., relax the assumption of constant hazard rates in our model above) could be allowed. These alternatives add realism, but they are analytically intractable. In §7, these alternative models are examined numerically to demonstrate that our main theoretical findings remain unaffected.
(v) Information Asymmetry. We assume that the primary source of information asymmetry is in the contribution of the candidate's type to posttransplant life expectancy. This can be interpreted in different ways: (a) A simple change of variables demonstrates that our formulation is equivalent to one where all candidate types have the same posttransplant life expectancy, but they differ in the quality-of-life score they assign to transplantation; (b) behavioral factors influence the likelihood of chronic rejection, and thus posttransplantation life expectancy. For example, candidates who are more compliant to the medication regime will enjoy improved outcomes, and similarly, candidates following a healthy lifestyle will enjoy similar benefits; (c) subtle clinical factors can also influence posttransplantation outcomes. In all these cases, the information about these factors driving outcomes is known to the candidate and his or her transplant team but is not available to the transplantation system.
In summary, the formulation presented here makes several simplifying assumptions for the sake of tractability. While evaluating these restrictive assumptions, the reader should bear in mind that clinical reality is complex and can never be completely captured in any tractable mathematical model. Because our objective here is to develop general principles for efficient allocation mechanisms in the presence of information asymmetry, we argue that focusing on a tractable model enables us to identify some of the key trade-offs involved. Translation of these insights to practice involves several additional steps taken concurrently with this analysis. These include the computational analysis of some of these mechanisms in more realistic models; see Su et al. (2004a) , where a model allowing candidates to change their type choice over time is analyzed and presented.
Achievable Regions Approach
In the problem formulations developed in §3, the decision variables are the allocation probabilities p = p i x , but the variables in the objective function and constraints are the kidney allocation rates and expected kidney qualities for each queue j, j , and j , respectively. In this section, we show how to reformulate these problems with the decision variables being = j and = j . The approach consists of three steps: (i) Characterize the space of all performance vectors and that can be achieved by some admissible allocation policy p (this is the so-called "achievable region"); (ii) maximize the objective over this performance space; and (iii) find the allocation that achieves the optimal performance measures. This approach has been used extensively in the multiclass scheduling literature (see Federgruen and Groenevelt 1988 or Shanthikumar and Yao 1992) , but the application to a problem where the performance vectors include both queueing performance and service-quality performance is novel.
We start by characterizing the achievable region for our partitioning problem. Let G x ≡ x 0 g u du, and for each index set S ⊆ 1 n , let S ≡ i∈S i and S ≡ i∈S i . Then, Proposition 1. The region of the achievable performance vectors is
The proof, given in the appendix, involves two steps. First, it is shown that every achievable pair of vectors must satisfy the conditions in (11). Then, for every pair in the set (11), the proof provides a synthesis algorithm to construct the allocation policy p = p i x that generates . The combinatorial set of constraints characterizing the achievable region in (11) has an intuitive interpretation. For each subset of candidate types S, there is an upper bound on organ quality that is attainable only when the best kidneys are exclusively reserved for candidates of these types.
Representation (11) leads to the following equivalent reformulation of the problems developed in §3:
(1) First-Best Efficiency. This refers to the full-information case with the efficiency objective. The formulation is: Obtain a pair of vectors to maximize (9) subject to (5) and (11). The optimal policy will be denoted F B .
(2) First-Best Equity. This refers to the full-information case with the equity objective. The formulation is: Obtain a pair of vectors to maximize (10) subject to (5) and (11). The optimal policy will be denoted F B .
(3) Second-Best Efficiency. This refers to the hidden information case with the efficiency objective. The formulation is: Obtain a pair of vectors to maximize (9) subject to (5), (11), and (8). The optimal policy will be denoted SB .
(4) Second-Best Equity. This refers to the hidden information case with the equity objective. The formulation is: Obtain a pair of vectors to maximize (10) subject to (5), (11), and (8). The optimal policy will be denoted SB .
Analytical Results
We are now in a position to characterize the optimal policies for the four formulations presented in §4, but first it will necessary to introduce one additional assumption and define the class of assortative partition polices.
New Assumption
Let R ≡ a + b 1 max x g x and r ≡ a + b n min x g x denote the best and worst possible transplant outcomes, respectively. The assumption is r > R
This states that if a decision maker can improve the system in the following two ways-increase the supply of kidneys from to , but all new kidneys will be of the lowest quality; or maintain the same supply of kidneys but increase the quality of all kidneys to the highest level-then the first improvement is preferable. This implies that the shortage of kidneys is so severe it cannot be sufficiently counteracted by an improvement in the quality of kidneys. Historical transplant data suggest this assumption applies to the current kidney allocation environment.
Assortative Partition Policies
In an assortative partition policy, the interval 0 1 is partitioned into consecutive nonoverlapping intervals
Then, a kidney of type x is allocated to queue i if x ∈ A i . In this policy, p i x = 1 if x belongs in the interval A i and the kidney arrival rate for queue i is i . The policy assigns the best group of kidneys A 1 to the lowest-risk candidates (Type 1), the second-best group of kidneys to Type 2 candidates, and so on.
Our main results state that in all four problem formulations developed in §4, the optimal policy is assortative, but the intervals in the policy change to reflect the objective function and whether information about the candidates' types is hidden or observable. 
Proposition 2. The first-best and second-best efficiency and equity policies are assortative partition policies. The kidney allocation rates associated with the optimal partitions are denoted
We will now interpret conditions (13)-(16). Because in all cases the optimal policy is assortative, it follows that lower-risk candidates are allocated higher-quality organs, and vice versa. What changes across policies is the fraction of organs allocated to each candidate type. In the first-best efficiency policy, (13) implies that *
That is, the organ supply is exhausted from fulfilling the demand from low-risk candidates, and higher-risk candidates are not allocated any organs at all. Therefore, this policy overwhelmingly favors the low-risk candidates. In the equity policy, the balance shifts towards the highrisk candidates, as indicated by condition (15): In this policy, the incremental utility of all candidate types is equalized, and hence the higher-risk candidates are implicitly favored because they need a larger fraction of the organ supply in order to attain the same increment as the lower-risk candidates.
In the case of hidden information, the balance shifts further to reflect the candidates' information advantage. Because the first-best efficiency policy favors the lower-risk candidates, it creates incentives for higherrisk candidates to misrepresent their types. This can be rectified by redistributing some supply of highquality organs from the low-risk candidates to the high-risk ones. This is done in a way that candidates are indifferent between declaring their true type or deflating their type by one level, as indicated by (14). The same underlying logic applies to the secondbest equity policy. Because the first-best equity policy favors the high-risk candidates, it creates incentives for the low-risk candidates to inflate their type. This is rectified by condition (16), where candidates are indifferent between reporting their type and inflating by one level.
The proof of Proposition 2 also provides additional insights regarding the nature of the incentive compatibility condition and their implications. These will be introduced now. First, conditions (14) and (16) suggest that one can focus on the local incentive compatibility conditions
where the utility of each candidate when she reports her type truthfully is compared to her utility when she either inflates or deflates her type by one level. This is formalized in the following lemma, which also states an implication of this statement with respect to the trade-off between quality of organs and quantity of organs:
Lemma 1. (i) An allocation policy is incentive compatible if and only if it is locally incentive compatible.
(ii) In an incentive compatible policy, the following conditions hold: 1 / 1 ≤ · · · ≤ n / n , 1 / 1 ≥ · · · ≥ n / n , and
The first statement is the discrete-time analogue of the first-order approach to incentive compatibility in continuous-type mechanism design models (see Mirrlees 1971) . The second statement implies that in an incentive compatible policy, lower-risk candidates opt for organs of higher quality, but in exchange their wait times increase and likelihood of transplantation decreases relative to higher-risk candidates.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we show that the four allocation policies derived above can be positioned along a "policy spectrum" in the following order: F B , SB , SB , F B . As one moves along this spectrum, high-risk candidates become better off, whereas low-risk candidates become worse off. From a societal perspective, moving along this spectrum gains equity at the expense of efficiency. The results will be provided in a simplified model with two candidate types: low-risk candidates (i = 1) and high-risk candidates (i = 2).
The first result characterizes the impact of these four allocation policies on the following candidate outcomes: quality-adjusted life expectancy U i , expected time on the waiting list W i , transplant likelihood i , and expected quality of the received kidney q i . For each of these quantities, superscripts denote the policy being used.
Proposition 3. (a) For the low-risk type
This result shows that as we move from F B to SB to SB to F B , low-risk candidates' utilities decrease (18), their wait times increase (19), and their transplant chances decrease (20). The opposite is true for high-risk candidates. Interestingly, for both lowrisk and high-risk candidates, (21) and (25) imply that all candidates who receive a kidney receive a kidney of better average quality: Low-risk candidates receive a smaller proportion of the kidney supply, and this raises the average quality because they continue to receive the best kidneys; high-risk candidates now additionally receive more of the higher-quality kidneys. Furthermore, information asymmetry benefits the high-risk candidates in the efficiency case and the low-risk candidates in the equity case because these are the candidate types that enjoy a higher utility when there is information asymmetry compared to the perfect information case.
The next result characterizes the impact of the four allocation policies on the equity and efficiency objective functions (9) and (10). Let the value of these two objectives under an allocation policy be denoted by EF F and EQ , respectively. Then,
As one moves along the policy spectrum F B , SB , SB , F B , the equity objective increases, whereas the efficiency objective decreases. It is not surprising that information asymmetry generates additional incentive constraints that render the first-best ideals unattainable: F B is more efficient than SB , and F B is more equitable than SB . More important, however, are the following observations: (i) The second-best efficiency policy is more equitable than its firstbest counterpart; (ii) the second-best equity policy is more efficient that its first-best counterpart. Therefore, information asymmetry sacrifices efficiency at the expense of equity, and vice versa. Hence, it can help balance the efficiency-equity trade-off.
Irrespective of the policy selected in the efficiencyequity spectrum, a multiple-queue allocation policy will always be preferable to a single waiting list. With multiple queues, transplant candidates choose over multiple alternatives. Some of these alternatives can be designed to mirror outcomes that would be achieved under a single queue. The additional flexibility offered by multiple queues can only improve outcomes.
Numerical Study
We now present a numerical study that demonstrates the analytical findings from § §4-6 in the context of a model calibrated using transplant data. Because transplant reality does not fit perfectly the restrictive assumptions that candidates of different types have the same pretransplantation mortality rate and that posttransplant life expectancy follows a particular functional form, we present both computational results derived from a model without these restrictive assumptions and analytical results derived from a model with these assumptions. The computational techniques used to solve the first-best and second-best efficiency and equity problems without the restrictive assumptions are described in Su (2004) .
Numerical Assumptions
According to waiting-list statistics reported in §2, with the normalized organ arrival rate set at = 1, the candidate arrival rate is = 24 492/11 508 = 2 13; this simple calculation ignores the effect of living related donors to the transplant system and it exaggerates the organ shortage. To estimate posttransplant expected survival we use data from the United States Renal Database System (USRDS 2004) to fit proportional hazards survival models with the following covariates: candidate and donor age, sex, race, body surface area and tissue matching; candidate transplant history; dialysis duration and modality; comorbidities; peak panel reactivity; blood transfusions and employment status; and donor cause of death and cold ischemia time (see Su et al. 2004a for more details). These covariates generate an estimate for each candidate's contribution to relative risk for organ failure, which enables us to classify all candidates into five distinct risk groups using the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles of the population risk distribution as cutoff points (indexed i = 1 5 . Similarly, a relative risk estimate is derived for each kidney, and this is used to reflect the kidney "type" or "quality." The space of kidney types is discretized into 100 subsets ranked in order of relative risk (indexed k = 1 100 . Finally, for every possible combination of candidate group i and kidney type k, the fitted hazards models provide an estimate for posttransplant life expectancy r ki . To obtain death hazards on the waiting list, exponential hazards models were fitted to pretransplant data for the same five candidate groups. For the analytical solution, we estimated the parameters of the functional form L i x = m + c i g x using exponential hazards models and estimated pretransplant death rates by fitting a single proportional hazard to all candidates. The parameters are summarized in Table 1, and Table 2 presents the key performance measures for both the first-best and second-best efficiency and equity policies, comparing both computational and analytical solutions. The following four observations are extracted from the numerical results:
(1) Although the computational solution is obtained after relaxing several assumptions, it does not translate to significantly improved performance outcomes for each candidate group. The optimal objective functions range between 7.59 and 8.40 under the computational solution, and they range between 7.57 and 8.39 under the analytical solution. This difference in outcomes is practically insignificant, and it suggests that the analytical model applies to the reallife transplantation environment, where several of the model's assumptions are violated.
(2) The first-best efficiency policy is ruthless: Type 1 and Type 2 candidates receive a kidney almost instantaneously, Type 3 candidates receive kidneys with some small probability, but Types 4 and 5 never receive any kidneys. By contrast, the incorporation of an equity objective or the incorporation of candidate informational advantages lead into policies that are more sensible: All candidate types are allocated a fraction of the available kidneys; better kidneys are allocated to lower-risk candidates, but at the expense of increased waiting time. As anticipated in § §4 and 5, in the second-best efficiency and equity policies the quality of the allocated kidneys deteriorates and the wait time decreases as one moves from low-risk to high-risk candidates.
(3) The results highlight a limitation of the equity objective function: In order to maximize the utility of the most risky candidate group, the equity-based policies assign a disproportionate fraction of kidneys to this group, driving their waiting time to zero. This represents a form of "reverse" discrimination that may not be acceptable. Interestingly, the same phenomenon appears in the second-best efficiency policy, where in an effort to avoid having the highest-risk candidates misrepresent their type, the policy assigns a disproportionate percentage of the kidneys to them.
(4) In the information asymmetry cases, there is very little difference between the efficiency and equity policies: In our computational solutions, average candidate utility is 7.85 quality-adjusted life years (QALY) under the second-best efficiency policy and 7.83 QALY under the second-best equity policy; minimum candidate utilities are 5.69 QALY and 6.21 QALY, respectively. These differences are much smaller compared to the discrepancies between the first-best efficiency and first-best equity policies.
Concluding Remarks
Designing an acceptable organ allocation system remains one of modern medicine's most difficult problems. As our results indicate, a policy that maximizes total expected utility discriminates against high-risk candidates, while a policy that maximizes equity discriminates against low-risk candidates. When candidates enjoy an information advantage, such a form of "discrimination" or "reverse discrimination" becomes expensive because it creates incentives for different candidates to misrepresent their type to avoid "discrimination." Explicitly accounting for such information asymmetry leads to a balanced position in the equity-efficiency spectrum: Lower-risk candidates are willing to wait longer in order to receive organs of better quality; higher-risk candidates enjoy reduced waiting times, but for organs of lower quality. As a result, every candidate has access to transplantation, and each candidate's access reflects his or her own preferences.
The analysis presented here assumes that the efficient allocation system is inequitable. From the perspective of a healthy individual there may be nothing inequitable about the efficient allocation system as long as there is no relationship between that individual's characteristics (known prior to the onset of kidney failure) and outcomes from transplantation. In most cases, however, one may expect certain healthy individuals more likely to be of high risk than others if they eventually develop kidney failure and require transplantation; e.g., there is a well-established correlation between race and transplant outcomes. Therefore, the equity objective is relevant given that differences in risks are known ex ante (prior to kidney failure) and not just ex post (after kidney failure). Even if differences in patient classes were identified only ex post, the equitable allocation would still be relevant because it would minimize extreme differences in access to transplantation between different patient groups-a desirable goal from the perspective of medical ethics.
Our analysis assumes that the candidates have an information advantage. Sophisticated information systems can enable the centralized allocation system to have better access to patient-level information and reduce the candidate's information advantage. Nevertheless, we claim that our mechanism design model remains applicable even in the presence of such systems for three reasons. First, centralization of information is often expensive and sometimes not even feasible. The added cost of the information system may not justify the potential improvement in outcomes. Second, even in the absence of information asymmetry, centralized allocation is not ideal because it will reduce the candidate's choice. Respect of candidate autonomy as exemplified by our system is one of the central tenets of medical ethics. Third, while the central authority may be able to obtain information about medical condition, information about individual preferences is likely to remain invisible. All these suggest that the incentive compatible systems would remain relevant.
Working out the processes and ethics of a choicedriven system such as the one analyzed here is a significant task that requires the consideration of the perspective of multiple parties. In this paper, we have focused on developing the fundamental models justifying this system. A more complete policy proposal is made in Ross et al. (2004) .
As in any model of a social system, our model involves numerous assumptions: Our definitions of efficiency and equity are not without controversy. The assumptions made in the queueing models are simplistic and made for tractability's sake. The notion of information asymmetry used here is probably too overreaching-the system will and does have access to some information about the candidate's type (i.e., it has an imperfect signal of the candidate's type). Expanding the model to a set of less restrictive assumptions would be an analytically difficult task, and it would not necessarily add any new insights. Hence, our approach has been to focus on a tractable model and present results for a computational model. The results support our approach, as they reveal very few differences between the computational and analytical models.
We conclude with a brief discussion of health care costs in kidney allocation. The cost of transplanting kidneys of lower quality is substantially higher than the cost of high-quality kidneys. Whiting et al. (2000) report that during the first five posttransplant years, cumulative medical expenditure averages $165,716 among recipients of ECD kidneys, but only $134,185 among recipients of regular kidneys. While utilizing kidneys of lower quality may enhance the survival prospects of the recipients, this may be an unattractive option for the insurers paying for these services. Hence, the implementation of a choice-based system such as the one advocated here may require the development of new payment mechanisms that would ensure that insurers paying for transplants of low quality are adequately covered for the financial risk they take. Exploration of these issues is a topic for future research.
Appendix. Main Proofs Terminology and Notation
We introduce new terminology for the appendix. Under the allocation policy p, define the set A i ⊂ × 0 1 as the union over x ∈ X of all line segments joining x i−1 k=1 p i x and x i k=1 p i x . These disjoint sets A i form a partition of the space × 0 1 and can be interpreted as the following implementation of the allocation policy p: When kidney x arrives, generate a random number u ∈ 0 1 , and assign the kidney to type i iff x u ∈ A i . Thus, we call the allocation policy p a partition policy, and denote it by the partition ≡ A i . We call A i allocation domains and use , to denote the values of , generated by . Notice that under an assortative partition policy, kidneys with types in A i are reserved exclusively for type i candidates. In this appendix, we also denote i ≡ i / i and i ≡ i / i .
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of this proposition is presented as two lemmas, separately establishing "⊆" (Lemma 2) and "⊇" (Lemma 3).
Lemma 2. For any allocation policy
, the quantities satisfy:
Proof. Conditions (i) and (ii) trivially follow from our model specification. For (iii), observe that G S is indeed an upper bound for S , attainable only when the allocation domains i∈S A i coincide with the leftmost interval 0 S . Proof. We will use induction over n and the case n = 1 is trivially true.
Suppose that and satisfy (i), (ii), and (iii). Observe that 1 0 g u du ≥ 1 ≥ − 1 g u du, where the first inequality follows from (iii), and the second follows from (ii) and (iii) for S = 2 n . Further, notice that the expression + 1 g u du is decreasing in for values of between 0 and − 1 . This means that we can use a search procedure to find the value of such that + 1 g u du = 1 , and we can set A 1 = + 1 . Now, we are left with ≡ 0 ∪ + 1 1 and we have to partition it into subsets A 2 A n with sizes and quality integrals dictated by . We claim that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied for this reduced-partitioning problem. Suppose not. Then, because (i) and (ii) are trivially satisfied, there must exist some index set J ⊂ 2 n such that (iii) is violated. That is, J > G J , where G x is defined over the reduced space by G x ≡ 0 y ∩X g u du, with y chosen such that the set 0 y ∩ X has Lebesgue measure x. Now, we consider two cases. First, if J ≤ , then G J = G J and thus J > G J , which contradicts (iii) in the original partitioning problem in the previous paragraph. Alternatively, if J > , then J > G J implies that J + 1 > G J + + 1 g u du, which yields J ∪ 1 > G J ∪ 1 , again contradicting (iii). Therefore, for the reduced problem, conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) must be satisfied.
By the induction hypothesis, we can find an appropriate partition for . Together with A 1 , this gives the desired partition for . This desired partition , by construction, satisfies = . This proof demonstrates that we can construct a partition from any achievable vector using the following O n algorithm.
Synthesis Algorithm
Let us first introduce some concepts used in the proof.
Definition 1. The following polytope
is called a polymatroid if the set function f S satisfies:
The following result (Edmonds 1970) considers the problem of maximizing a linear function over a polymatroid.
and * i = 0 for i > m. The proof of these results is based on linear programming duality and has been omitted. Next, we show that the achievable region in Proposition 1 has polymatroidal structure (this is a standard result included here for completeness).
Lemma 5. For each fixed vector , the set of achievable shown below is a polymatroid.
Proof. It suffices to verify that the set function G S satisfies the three conditions in Definition 1. The first two can be shown easily. To prove the third, let us denote 1 ≡ S 1 , 2 ≡ S 2 , ≡ S 1 ∪ S 2 , ≡ S 1 ∩ S 2 , and write
and
Because 1 + 2 = + and g u is assumed to be decreasing, we have G 1 + G 2 ≥ G + G , and submodularity is established.
The next result provides a simple condition on that ensures that these quantities can be generated by an assortative partition policy.
Lemma 6. Suppose that are achievable and satisfy
Then, the output of the synthesis algorithm is an assortative partition policy.
Proof. Please refer to the synthesis algorithm provided at the end of the proof for Proposition 1. Under the condition (36), we may verify that the value of * i chosen in
Step 2 of the algorithm is i k=1 k , i.e., selecting the leftmost possible A i * i , for each iteration i. Therefore, the output is an assortative partition policy.
We are now ready to begin the proof of Proposition 2. The four policies will be examined separately. Proofs for F B and SB will be provided here; the other proofs are similar and appear in Su (2004) .
Proof of Proposition 2 (For F B ). This part of the proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. For each fixed and feasible vector , Lemma 5 shows that the remaining optimization over is a polymatroid optimization problem with a linear objective. Lemma 4 then allows us to conclude that the solution satisfies
. By Lemma 6, the solution is an assortative partition policy.
Step 2. Substituting (36) into the objective function reduces (9), (5), and (11) to the following problem over only. 
Let L i , M i , J be Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first and second inequalities in (38) and (39), respectively. The KKT conditions give, for each i = 1 n: 
This strict monotonicity, together with complementary slackness (41), implies that there is some k such that M i > 0, L i = 0 when i < k and M i = 0 when i ≥ k, and that L i = M i = 0 may possibly occur only at i = k. The characterization (13) thus follows. Proof of Proposition 2 (For SB ). This part of the proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1. Using the assumption imposed in (12) and local IC (17), we can show that constraint (5) is redundant and may be omitted.
Step 2. Let us classify the local IC conditions into upward local IC, i.e., the set IC i i+1 n−1 i=1 ; and downward local IC, i.e., the set IC i i−1 n i=2 . We can show that: (i) optimality implies that the downward IC conditions must bind, and (ii) upward IC follows from the binding downward IC conditions. Complete details for these first two steps appear in Su (2004) .
Step 3. We will now show that the solution, under a particular permutation i of indices, is an assortative partition policy. Our results so far allow us to rewrite the program (9), (5), (11), and (8) 
The convexity of the achievable region determined by (44) and (45) is readily established by a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality (because G x = x 0 g u du is concave, by the fact that g u is decreasing). Now, it is well known that there is no "duality gap" for convex programs (refer to Rockafellar 1970 for example). Therefore, we may equivalently study the following program, which is the Lagrangean relaxation of the constraints in (46) 
For each set of feasible values for L and (and in particular, for the optimal values), we are left with a polymatroid optimization problem over , by Lemma 5. Let i denote the permutation of indices such that the coefficients of i in (47) decreases as i increases from 1 to n. Then, Corollary 1 and Lemma 6 allow us to conclude that the second-best efficiency policy is an assortative partition policy under the permutation i .
Step 4. Finally, we identify the order of the solution intervals and show that the permutation i is the identity permutation. By Lemma 1(ii), we have q 1 ≥ · · · ≥ q n . Therefore, the solution intervals must be arranged from left to right over 0 in order of increasing indices; that is, A * Proof of Lemma 1. We shall use IC ij to denote the IC condition (8) for each i, j. The term "local IC" will be used to refer to the set IC ij for every i, j such that i − j = 1. There are two parts of this lemma to prove: (i) Suppose local IC holds. Consider any i < j. We will show that IC ij holds. Here, we say that k prefers A i to A j , denoted A i k A j , if a i + b k i ≥ a j + b k j . The condition IC j−1 j , which follows from local IC, implies that A j−1 j−1 A j . That is, b j−1 j−1 − j ≥ a j − j−1 , which implies that b j−2 j−1 − j ≥ a j − j−1 , because j−1 − j ≥ 0 by Lemma 1. Hence, A j−1 j−2 A j . Combined with IC j−2 j−1 and the transitivity of preferences admitting utility representations, we have A j−2 j−2 A j . Inductively, this yields A i i A j , which is precisely IC ij . The same argument shows that local IC also yields IC ij for any j < i. Therefore, local IC guarantees "global" IC.
(ii) Suppose there is some i such that i > i+1 . IC i+1 i implies that we must have i < i+1 . Now, IC i+1 i gives
which contradicts IC i i+1 . Therefore, we must have 1 ≤ · · · ≤ n . By local IC, this in turn implies that 1 ≥ · · · ≥ n . Finally, because q i = i / i , we have q 1 ≥ · · · ≥ q n . Proof of Propositions 3 and 4. These results follow from straightforward algebra. See Su (2004) for the details.
